An Extract From On the Philosophy of Education by Daniele-Hadi Irandoost
Although the Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations are both about language, one is more likely to find the latter intriguing upon learning that Wittgenstein had radically revised his ideas in that work, after realising, as he plainly admitted there, he had made ‘grave mistakes’ in the former (Wittgenstein 2001: xe). A curious development, without doubt, deserving further attention, especially when bearing in mind Philosophical Investigations is sometimes considered one of the most influential, if not revolutionary, works of philosophy in the 20th century, specifically about the significance of language (Richter, no date). With that mentioned, this section commences with a brief outline of Wittgenstein’s later thoughts on language. Those ideas are then applied to criticise Clark, his critics, and the broader community of thinkers mentioned hitherto. Lastly, we examine potential critiques against Philosophical Investigations and provide possible responses.
To begin with, it is worth noting, Wittgenstein’s goal with Philosophical Investigations was to take the debate on language significantly further than his earlier work, particularly in light of the emergence of his new conception about ‘language-games’. Crucially, this time around, Wittgenstein (2001: 12e) argued meaning was derived from the ‘use’, or ‘application’, of words rather than their picturing. In consequence, very much like tools in a toolbox, Wittgenstein believed a single word could be utilised in different contexts for different purposes, depending on the language-game within which words are being played. Accordingly, he noticed the call ‘Slab!’ might denote a range of different understandings on its own. So, for instance, the word might mean the object itself (slab), or alternatively an order to bring one, etcetera, etcetera (ibid.: 4e). In equal measure, to present something of a slightly unusual implication, one might insist that a Christian and an Atheist should not clash with one another simply because their language-games operate under different ‘rules’ (ibid.: 23e); rules (definitions and judgments) that are collectively accepted within their own specific community (Hamlyn, 1988: 312). All suggesting, eventually, that giving orders, reporting an event, guessing riddles, making up a story, and even tones of voice, facial expressions, and body movements may constitute language-games; each in their own special and unique way (Wittgenstein, 2001: 10e). For Wittgenstein, all intents and purposes considered, the entire process, including the interweaving of actions, naming, and repeating words, is a language-game overall (ibid.: 4e). The difference with the Tractatus, to compare the ‘nitty-gritties’, is that words are now positioned within a language-game, meaning they could not lose their essence, even in spite of hypothetical cases whereby the object itself ceased to exist under a particular set of circumstances (ibid.: 17e-18e).
Obviously, the theory of language being sketched has clear implications for Clark’s extended-mind theory. A position imputing Clark’s work is only a language-game, nothing else. Similarly, that noted, cognitive philosophy — as Clark’s framework of reference — functions under two language-games: one based on rules in cognitive observation, the other inside philosophy; a combination of which is likely to result in confusion and misunderstanding. Either way, one might uphold, even the criticisms against the extended-mind theory are subconscious language-games in toto. When, therefore, Adams and Aizawa are criticising the extended-cognition (mind) theory, the authors do not seem to recognise that their critique is only a contrary language-game, notwithstanding any questions it may raise, say, with regards to the way cognitive and non-cognitive processes are defined, in their unique field of cognitive psychology — as yet another attempted combination of two language-games into one, cognitive science with psychology. What goes without saying is that almost any spectrum pointed out by any one of the afore-named authors — particularly Carruthers and Boucher regarding the relationship between language and thought — all in effect merely form a comparable language-game, and so on.
As a central figure in the historical development of analytic philosophy, Wittgenstein’s primary aim throughout his life was to solve deep philosophical problems perennially haunting philosophers. Already, as mentioned in the previous section, he had tried this in the Tractatus by declaring ‘transcendental’ issues had to be discarded altogether as things without pictures. However, it was only with Philosophical Investigations when Wittgenstein, having altered his conceptual framework, proposed that the philosopher’s object is to clarify thought by way of elucidating propositions within individual language-games (Hamlyn, 1988: 306). To Wittgenstein (2001: 16e), in broad strokes, problems within philosophy arose when language ‘goes on holiday’. It is against this context that while Clark and his opponents operate within the same Anglo-American analytic tradition, there appears to be an intentional conflict betwixt their language-games, when in fact there should not be any, according, that is, to Wittgenstein’s overall assessment. Interestingly, Adams and Aizawa (2010: x) themselves seem to admit there is likely going to be an endless clash between their ideas and the proponents of the extended-mind. In all likelihood, without seeming to be aware of its background existence, they are acknowledging there is, as a matter of fact, a conflict between two language-games in play; one which they are sure ‘will press on’, and perhaps never lead to a resolution (ibid.: x).
By parallel measure, it is worth stressing, the same defence is equally applicable to such critiques of Wittgenstein involving case studies consisting of individuals affected by certain medical problems. One example, in this connection, is Varley’s report regarding an ‘a-grammatic aphasic’ with poor grammatical structure processing who was able to pass tests for ‘Theory of Mind’ as well as ‘causal reasoning’, indicating — in a manner of speaking — that (propositional) thought might, despite Wittgenstein, be independent of language (Carruthers and Boucher, 1998c: 124). Another (albeit similar) example is delivered by Goldin-Meadow and Zheng, whose studies around deaf children using home-sign to express thoughts and emotions without any previous engagement with a conventional language model, seems to suggest that (at le
Although these cases might initially look as though they weaken Wittgenstein’s theory of language (by shifting the balance toward the communicative understanding of language), he personally would have counter-argued that all are language-games, while adding it would be impossible to express the chance of any separation of thought from language if language-games did not exist. Analogously, one may assert that what really goes on inside the minds of those (deaf or aphasic) individuals can only remain an epistemological mystery for us because there is no way to truly find out the content. Indeed, the problematic nature of any study regarding the relationship between language and thought is also made obvious through the work of recent scholars on language, particularly considering the collection of opposing results that different researchers have entailed so far. Even more notable is the fact that authors writing on this topic are somewhat unsure about their own findings, frequently stating that further research is required for ‘firm conclusions’ (Carruthers and Boucher, 1998a: 18).
All things considered, one cannot but be surprised that, no matter the rigour of his theory, Wittgenstein is mentioned only three times in passing throughout the entire edited book, Language and Thought (one of the more authoritative contemporary texts on the relation between language and thought), by Carruthers and Boucher, whose chapters are penned by 13 scholars from a diverse range of expertise. Whilst this is not to say that Carruthers and Boucher’s collection of edited essays is pointless, it is crucial, surely, that authors in this broad field (cognitive science) focus on their own unique language-game, rather than clash with the language-games of others. The clear implication of this argument, following Wittgenstein’s point of view, is that the two camps on the above-mentioned spectrum, and those remaining in the midsection, distance themselves from conflict and, instead, concentrate on a descriptive account of their own unique language-game. This should not only remove confusion in language, but ensure the right questions are being asked, as progress is made in research.
